

AFTERSHOCKS ALONG BURMA'S MEKONG

Reef-blasting and military-style development in Eastern Shan State

The Lahu National Development Organisation

August 2003

The Lahu National Development Organisation

The Lahu National Development Organisation was set up by a group of leading Lahu democracy activists in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in March 1997 to promote the welfare and well-being of the Lahu people, including the promotion of alternatives to growing opium.

The objectives of the LNDO are:

- To promote democracy and human rights in Shan State, with particular attention paid to the Lahu
- To promote increased understanding among the Lahu, Wa, Pa-O, Palaung and Shan of human rights, democracy, federalism, community development and health issues
- To develop unity and cooperation among the Lahu and other highlanders from Shan State and to provide opportunities for development of civic leadership skills among local groups.

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cover design based on photo of Mekong blasting from www.chiangrai.com

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Introduction

The Mekong River has a special significance for the Lahu people. Like the Chinese, we call it the Lancang, and according to our legends, the first Lahu people came from the river's source. Our traditional songs and sayings are filled with references to the river. True love is described as stretching from the source of the Mekong to the sea. The beauty of a woman is likened to the glittering scales of a fish in the Mekong.

Many of the Lahu in Shan State live along the river, and like the other peoples living and depending on the river, were not consulted about plans to blast the Mekong reefs. The first they knew about the plans were when the explosions began, destroying forever sections of the river which had sustained them physically and spiritually for generations.


Secrecy and lack of consultation with affected communities are common aspects of development projects under the military regime in Burma. To this day, the Burmese state-run media has not even mentioned the Mekong reef-blasting program to the general public. What is more alarming is that this navigation improvement project is a regional initiative under the Greater Mekong Subregion Program of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and should have been carried out according to rigorous international standards, ensuring proper environmental and social impact assessments and participation of all affected communities.

The GMS program is forging ahead with its plans to promote infrastructure and energy projects, trade, investment and tourism in the region, including Burma. It thus appears that the lack of democracy in Burma, far from being an obstacle in this process, is conveniently silencing local communities who might voice opposition to these developments.

This report aims to give a voice to some of these silenced communities in Burma's eastern Shan State. The international media has been effective in exposing many negative environmental impacts of the Mekong reef-blasting, particularly along the Thai section of the river. However, there has been no analysis of the political and socio-economic context of the Mekong navigation improvement project in Burma, and particularly how the project fits into the Burmese military regime's plans to expand control over the remote regions of Eastern Shan State and increase their exploitation of the people and resources there. This report focuses on these issues.

Most of the research for the report was conducted between December 2002 and May 2003 by local researchers who traveled through eastern Shan State, along the Mekong River, and along the northern Thai-Shan border. Research was hampered by tight security by the Burmese military regime along the river during the period of blasting.

RAPIDS AND REEFS TARGETED FOR BLASTING UNDER PHASE ONE OF THE UPPER MEKONG NAVIGATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT



Executive Summary

In March 2002, Chinese demolition crews began blasting rapids and reefs along Burma's Mekong river as part of the ADB-promoted Mekong Navigation Improvement Project, aimed to allow larger ships to travel the river throughout the year. There was no consultation with the over 22,000 Shan, Akha and Lahu peoples living along and relying on the Burmese section of the river.

Suspended during the rainy season, full-scale blasting resumed between December 2002 and April 2003. During this time, Burma's military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), mobilized over 1,000 troops along the river, who imposed restrictions on the movement of villagers, forcibly conscripted porters, committed sexual violence and extorted funds from local communities. The SPDC also set up new military outposts to expand their control along the Mekong.

Development of the Mekong has thus precipitated further SPDC militarization in eastern Shan State, and further oppression of local communities. It also fits into a development agenda of the Burmese military regime which is benefiting only a small elite, and contributing to environmental degradation and the impoverishment of the majority of the population.

The number of SPDC troops in the area has more than tripled over the past decade, despite the supposed pacification of the area resulting from ceasefire agreements with most of the ethnic resistance groups since 1989.

The ceasefire agreements, together with the opening up of Burma's economy since 1988, have led to a process of inequitable and unsustainable development in Shan State, whereby the regime, ceasefire leaders and other business elites have profited from unbridled exploitation of the area's natural resources, with disastrous effects on the environment. It is estimated that eastern Shan State has lost 50% of its forest cover since 1988. Wildlife and forest products are also diminishing rapidly.

The military and business elites continue to profit from the drug trade, while the hill communities growing the opium remain in poverty, and the rate of drug addiction amongst local villagers, particularly along the Mekong River, one of the main drug trafficking routes, is soaring. Luxurious casinos for tourists have been built amidst areas of extreme poverty.

In the absence of democracy in Burma, increased trade and tourism resulting from the Mekong Navigation Improvement Project will only further accelerate this harmful pattern of development in Eastern Shan State.

The LNDO urges the governments of China, Laos and Thailand to immediately suspend the Mekong Navigation Improvement Project until proper environmental and social impact assessments are carried out with participation of affected communities. A prerequisite for this must be the restoration of genuine peace and democracy in Burma.

LNDO therefore urges foreign governments and international funding agencies to withhold support for all development projects inside Burma's Shan State until a democratic system of government is installed which allows local people genuine participation in decision-making about the development of their area.

THE UPPER MEKONG NAVIGATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

Background of the project

The Upper Mekong Navigation Improvement Project is part of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Program, involving Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Yunnan province of China. The GMS program, initiated and funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), aims, in its own words, “to help strengthen the economic and social well-being of peoples in the subregion through regional cooperation initiatives that facilitate trade, investment, energy development and supply, the growth of tourism, human resource development, and the protection of the environment.” *

Plans for the Mekong navigation improvement project were conceived in the early 1990s, and finalized and approved by the governments of Burma, China, Laos and Thailand in early 2002. The aim of the project is to enable larger shipping vessels to travel along the Mekong River between southern Yunnan province and Luang Prabang in Laos. Under natural conditions, the waterway is navigable throughout the year for vessels of 60 tons only. The project aims to remove major rapids and reefs in order for vessels of up to 500 tons to navigate the river for most of the year.

The project is divided into three phases: the first phase,** currently underway, is to remove 11 major rapids and 10 scattered reefs, mostly along the Burma-Lao stretch of the river, to enable vessels of 100-150 tons to navigate the river for at least 95% of the year. The first phase began in March-April 2002, then halted during the rainy season, and was resumed in December 2002, continuing until mid-April 2003. In December 2003-March 2004, it is planned to blast the remaining reefs on the Burma-Lao border and one reef on the Thai-Lao stretch of the river.

Under the second phase, it is planned to remove 51 rapids and shoals, in order for vessels of at least 300 tons to navigate the river for 95% of the year. Under the third phase, the waterway is to be canalized, in order to be navigable for vessels of 500 tons for at least 95% of the year.

Environmental concerns

Thai and international environmentalists have been calling for a halt to the project until a proper social and environmental impact assessment is conducted, involving the participation of local communities.

* The Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program, Interim GMS Assistance Plan 2000-2002, October 1999)

** Mekong Rapids Under Fire (Southeast Asia Rivers Network, Project for Rivers and Communities, Love Chiang Khong Group, Oct 2002)

Concerns about the project focus on the potential damage to the ecosystem of the Mekong Basin, as the rapids serve as vital spawning ground for fish and plants such as Mekong seaweed. The Mekong is habitat to around 200 fish species, some of which are endangered. The rapids are also nesting areas for various bird species in the dry season.

Further potential environmental impacts from the project include the increased water pollution from the larger ships that will navigate the Mekong, releasing waste and oil, and stirring up sediment through their propellers. Also, the removal of the rapids will cause changes in the waterway and thereby cause increased riverbank erosion.

The project also has potential social impacts for villagers living along the Mekong: Fishing communities and local boatmen will lose their livelihood; communities relying on various river plants, including Mekong seaweed, for consumption and sale, will be affected; villagers who grow vegetables in gardens along the riverbank in the dry season risk losing these gardens due to riverbank collapse, or due to building of landing sites or embankments related to the project; communities relying on the river for daily water supply will be adversely affected by the pollution caused by the project.



Hoe Phaw reef targeted for blasting (photo by LNDO, January 2003)

Burma's role in the project

The close ties between Burma and China made it inevitable that Burma would agree to a project that was so clearly beneficial to China's trading interests. China is currently one of Burma's strongest international allies, and one of its main trading partners. In the 1990s, China supplied Burma with an estimated US\$3 billion worth of arms and military equipment. It continues to provide equipment and training to the regime's army and has helped Burma develop naval and radar facilities on the Indian Ocean. Burma is promoting tourism from China, and since July 2002, Chinese tourists have been allowed to use Chinese currency in Burma.

The Burmese military regime has also been keen to join regional initiatives that give it legitimacy and access to international funding. The ADB has suspended all direct loans to Burma since 1987, but has provided technical and financial support to projects in Burma under the GMS Program.

It also appears that the Burmese regime foresaw advantages to the opening up of the remote eastern Shan State border. For over a decade, it had been expedient for the regime to leave the area largely under the control of ethnic ceasefire armies and pro-government militias, condoning and sharing in the profits from their exploitation of the local natural resources and their involvement in the drug-trade. However, the regime had been steadily building up its troop presence in the area, and was clearly waiting for the opportunity to begin edging out these ethnic armed groups in order to strengthen its control and increase its profits from the growing trade and investment in the area. The Mekong navigation improvement project offered just such an opportunity.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT - DECEMBER 2002 TO APRIL 2003

The blasting of the reefs along the eastern Shan border between December 15 2002 and April 15 2003 bore the usual hallmarks of development projects under the Burmese military regime: lack of consultation with and information to local communities about the project; increased military security, and accompanying human rights abuses against local populations.

Lack of consultation with local communities about the blasting

Prior to the blasting there was no consultation process with any of the estimated over 22,000 people living along the Burma-Lao section of the Mekong. Most of the villagers are Shan, Lahu, and Akha (see map on page 8). Villagers all along the river use it for fishing. In the southern section, east of Tachilek, many of the villagers also own small boats which they use to trade across and along the river. Along the central section, villagers also collect “khai” weed in the river for sale.

Villagers interviewed by LNDO state that they only learned of the blasting when the Chinese demolition crews arrived by boat and began preparations. During December 2002, eleven “demolition sites” had been established along the river (see map on page 9). At each site, several two-tiered Chinese boats, carrying crews of workers, were moored to carry out the blasting in the river.

A calendar in Chinese, Laotian, Burmese and Thai marking when the blasting was to take place was distributed to cargo boat drivers in December 2002. It showed that during the period of December 15 2002 to April 15 2003 the waterway would be open for boat traffic only one day in four. On the other three days, blasting would go ahead. However, this poster was not distributed widely, and was not stuck up in public places.


Owing to the fact that boat traffic was restricted to certain days, the traffic appears to have become heavier on these days, on at least one occasion with tragic results. As the Shan Herald Agency for News reported in January 2003:

“On December 31, 2002, seven Lahu villagers from Burma were drowned when their small boat capsized in the wake of large boats on the Mekong. On the day of the accident the small long-tail boat had left from the Shan side of the river, near Pa Liao-Keng Larb, to travel across to the Lao side with eight villagers on board. Soon after it left the bank, it was overturned by the wake of at least five Chinese cargo boats travelling downstream. Of the eight villagers, seven men drowned, but one woman wearing a life-jacket survived. At least one body was later recovered downstream.”

Despite having distributed the calendar showing the days for blasting, the Chinese blasting teams ended up not sticking to their original plans. Apparently due to requests by cargo boat-owners to allow more time for transporting their goods along the Mekong, in January 2003 the blasting times became more flexible.

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RAPID/REEF BLASTING BASE CAMPS (DECEMBER 2002)



Hoe Phaw camp

Restrictions on villagers' movements and resulting loss of livelihood

When the blasting started in December 2002, villagers in eastern Shan State living along the Mekong River were ordered by local SPDC military units not to travel along the riverbank, and had to request permission from SPDC troops to access the riverbank, even just to go fishing. They were also told that no strangers were allowed within 3 miles of the riverbank or else they would be arrested. Although the SPDC did not state that these security measures were connected to the blasting, villagers suspected that this was the real reason, as they had never been issued such orders before.

These restrictions on movement caused severe hardship for villagers whose livelihoods depended on access to the river. A Lahu fisherman from Ta Be village near Paliao-Kenglarb, ended up migrating down to Mae Sai in Thailand to earn his living as a labourer:

"I earned my living from fishing in the Mekong, just as my parents did before me. I didn't have a farm. Before, I could fish at any time, day or night, but starting in December (2002), I had to go and get permission from the Burmese soldiers if I wanted to go and fish in the day. Sometimes I only got permission to fish once a week. At night it was completely forbidden.

Before, if I didn't manage to catch fish in the day, I could go at night. But when I was not allowed to fish at night, I couldn't catch enough to earn a living. That's why I had to come down to the town to find other work." (Interview, May 15, 2003)

SPDC military operations along the Mekong riverbank during the period of blasting

The SPDC launched a major military operation along the west bank during the months when the blasting took place along the Mekong. About 1,000 troops from ten battalions based in Kengtung, Mong Phyak, Mong Yawng, Talerh and Tachilek, including five new battalions under the SPDC's #18 Triangle Region Command, were sent to patrol along the riverbank from January to April 2003 (see map on page 11). Although the villagers were told that the operation was to crack down on drugs, many local people commented on the fact that that there were no arrests or seizures of drugs during the operation, and that they thought the operation was aimed to provide security for the blasting.


When the SPDC troop patrols entered their areas, villagers suffered increased restrictions of movement. The SPDC commanders issued further orders to headmen at villages along the river, telling them not to stray outside the immediate vicinity of their villages "for their own safety" during the operation. The same Lahu villager recounted:

“It became even worse when the regime began conducting their “anti-drug” operation. People didn’t dare go outside their villages. In the village, up until now, the military are keeping a record of who is entering and leaving. Anyone who goes to spend the night even in a neighbouring village must register with the headman. “ (Interview May 15, 2003)

Human rights abuses during the military operation

Although the tight security during the SPDC military operation along the Mekong banks made it difficult to obtain information from local communities, various reports have reached LND0 revealing that human rights abuses were committed by the patrolling troops.

SPDC MILITARY OPERATIONS ALONG THE MEKONG DURING RAPID/REEF BLASTING Jan – April 2003



In accordance with their usual practice, the SPDC military forcibly conscripted porters during their military operation along the banks of the Mekong:

“Even though they (the SPDC) had announced they wouldn’t be fetching porters, a father and son from the nearby Lahu village of Pa Len were seized when they were out searching for their cattle. They were taken for 8 days to carry supplies. They were made to work at night. As soon as the sun went down they had to carry supplies.” (Interview, May 15, 2003)

LNDO is aware of at least two incidents of rape committed by SPDC troops during their military operation along the Mekong riverbanks during January-April 2003. In one case, at the end of February 2003, SPDC troops raped a Wa woman near the United Wa State Army camp at Paliao. In the second week of April SPDC troops raped a Lahu woman at Keng Larb. The woman was married with three children, but was divorced by her husband after the rape, and subsequently left the village. In neither case were the perpetrators punished.

Compulsory gambling fairs

Although gambling is restricted in Burma, it is a common means for SPDC troops to raise funds from local communities. SPDC troops authorize local organisers to run gambling fairs, and then demand a share of the profits.

During the military operations conducted along the Mekong in early 2003, the SPDC ordered village headmen in various tracts in northern Tachilek township to organise one-week gambling fairs for the local villagers. 20 village headmen from the tract of Pangpen were summoned by SPDC in January and ordered to arrange a fair in Pangpen in the first week of February. Subsequently, fairs were organised in the nearby tracts of Nam Khin, Paliao, and Kenglarb.

Apart from being used to raise funds for their military operation, it is also likely that the gambling fairs were a means for the SPDC to distract the local villagers from paying attention to the blasting being carried out in their immediate vicinity.

POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE PROJECT

A pattern of increased militarization in Eastern Shan State

The mobilization of increased numbers of SPDC troops in eastern Shan State during the period of blasting in early 2003, follows a pattern of militarization which has been continuing in the area for decades, but has intensified in recent years under the current military regime.

Militarization in eastern Shan State began in 1950 when Chinese nationalist troops were driven south by Mae Zedong's forces, and set up bases along the Mekong River. Burmese troops were sent in from Central Burma to repel the invaders, setting up a military infrastructure that remained even after the Chinese nationalist soldiers were finally driven out in 1961. By this time, ethnic and communist insurgencies were active in eastern Shan State, and became the new target for the Burmese troops, who employed anti-insurgency tactics against local civilian populations, and began training and arming local ethnic militias against the rebels.

In 1989, the Burmese communist resistance movement collapsed, and the regime began negotiating ceasefire agreements with former rebel groups; they were allowed to maintain their arms, and conduct business in their areas in return for not fighting the regime. To date, the regime has reached ceasefire agreements with nine armed groups in Shan State. The ceasefire group with the largest area of operation in easternmost Shan State is the National Democratic Alliance Army, formerly part of the Communist Party of Burma, which was allowed to control the area along the Chinese border northeast of Kengtung.

Although the ceasefire agreements were touted by the regime as heralding peace and development for border communities, the lack of political settlement with the ceasefire groups has meant continuing mistrust, causing both sides to maintain their military infrastructure, thus perpetuating the militarization process in the border areas. By early 2003, the total number of troops of the various armies in eastern Shan State had increased fourfold since 1988 to about 6,000 (see maps on pages 16 -17).

The continuing militarization has led to increased oppression by military forces of local populations. Particularly during the last five years, the regime has decreased its support for regional battalions, encouraging them instead to extort rations and funds from local populations. Villagers are ordered to sell quotas of their rice harvest to the military at hugely deflated prices (currently 8 baskets per acre at 350 kyat per basket, compared to the market price of 1,500 kyat per basket).

The SPDC military battalions are also confiscating more and more land from villagers, either to cultivate crops for the military, or to sell off to investors. For example, a Shan refugee family from Mung Phong, near the Mekong River just north of the Thai border, interviewed in October 2002, recounted how their fields and those of the other villagers were confiscated by the SPDC in April 2002 in order to sell to Wa investors to plant fruit orchards.

Other serious human rights abuses by the SPDC military personnel against local ethnic civilians are commonplace. For example, the report “Licence to Rape” issued by the Shan Women’s Action Network and the Shan Human Rights Foundation in June 2002 documents how soldiers from SPDC LIB 334 in the township of Murng Yawng, which adjoins the Mekong, ranked among the most notorious for sexual violence in Shan State.

Impoverishment caused by extortion and other abuses of the SPDC has caused a steady migration of people from rural villages in eastern Shan State down to Tachilek, and across into Thailand in search of work. Few young people remain in most of the rural villages in Tachilek township. Increasing numbers of beggars from across the border are now to be seen in the Thai border town of Mae Sai.

Expansion of SPDC control along the Mekong

The SPDC not only increased the number of its troops along the Mekong during the period of blasting in early 2003, but also seized control of areas which had formerly been under ethnic ceasefire armies or pro-government militias.

Although the main towns and surrounding valley areas in the townships adjoining the Mekong have remained under the control of the regime’s troops for several decades, the regime has allowed various ethnic ceasefire organisations and pro-government militias to control the remote mountainous regions, particularly along the Mekong River bank. At the end of 2002, there were six main armed groups controlling the areas along the banks of the Mekong River in eastern Shan State. Each group had outposts on the river where they collected taxes from boats passing by. From north to south:

1. The **National Democratic Alliance Army**, led by Sai Lin a.k.a Lin Ming Xian, controlling areas northeast of Kengtung along the Chinese border. This group used to form part of the Communist Party of Burma till the CPB’s collapse in 1989. The headquarters of the NDAA is at Mong La, on the Chinese border, a casino resort for Chinese tourists. The NDAA has two battalions (912 and 911), with an estimated 500 troops. NDAA leader Sai Lin is Chinese, and notorious as a major drug kingpin. He is the son-in-law of another former ceasefire army leader, Pheung Kya-shin of the Kokang Chinese group, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Sai Lin is known to be close to SPDC Secretary One General Khin Nyunt.



NDAA soldier guarding NDAA headquarters at Mong La, March 2003

2. A **United Wa State Army** faction led by Pao Yu Hwa, controlling the Nam Yawn area since 2000. This faction is linked to the northern UWSA ceasefire group; Pao Yu-hwa is the younger brother of Pao Yu-chang, chairman of UWSA. There were about 200 troops in the Nam Yawn area at the end of 2002. This group is closely linked to Chan Yin-chang, a notorious Chinese drug warlord, who acts as liaison with Gen. Khin Nyunt.

3. A **United Wa State Army** faction led by Wei Hsueh-yi, younger brother of well-known drug trafficker Wei Hsueh-kang, influential in the southern UWSA. In 2000, Wei Hsueh-kang bought a stretch of about 50 square kilometers of land south of Paliao-Kenglarb from SPDC, and moved an estimated 700 troops and civilians to the area between 2000-2002, where they set up fruit orchards and poultry and pig farms.


4. A **Lahu** militia group led by Wilson, controlling parts of the Paliao-Kenglarb area. Their headquarters is at Talerh. This militia was set up in the 1970s and consists of about 150 armed men, who regularly assist SPDC in their military operations.

5. Another **Lahu** militia group led by Kya U, controlling the river bank below Paliao-Kenglarb down as far as Murng Phong. His base camp was at Yang Hsin village, between Tachilek and Talerh. Their militia was also set up in the 1970s and consisted of about 120 armed men. They too regularly assisted SPDC in their military operations.


6. Remnants of the **Mong Tai Army** (a former Shan resistance group led by drug warlord Khun Sa, who surrendered in late 1995), controlling the riverbank east of Tachilek. There are several armed ex-MTA units operating around Tachilek: one of about 200 men led by Ye Sel, based at Loi Taw Kham, 15 kms west of Tachilek; one of about 100 men led by Petru based at Murng Bu, about 10 kms west of Tachilek; and one of about 100 men led by Sai Naw Kham based at Pang Ku village, about 15kms northwest of Tachilek. The various units cooperate to control the Mekong river trade east of Tachilek.

However, during the period of blasting from late 2002 to early 2003, significant changes were made to this power balance, leaving SPDC in control of the whole southern section of the Mekong river bank.

ARMED GROUPS IN EASTERN SHAN STATE IN EARLY 1988



ARMED GROUPS IN EASTERN SHAN STATE IN 2003



Forced withdrawal and disarming of militia groups along the Mekong riverbank (December 02)

In late December 2002, three pro-government militia groups controlling areas along the Mekong riverbank in eastern Tachilek township were ordered by the SPDC to withdraw from their outposts on the river.

The Lahu militia operating along the southern stretch of the Mekong, led by Kya U, were ordered to disarm completely and hand over their weapons to the SPDC. The Lahu militia operating further north, near Paliao-Kenglarb, led by Wilson, were not ordered to disarm, but had to retreat to their headquarters at Talerh. By being moved from their positions on the river, they were thus immediately deprived of their main sources of income from taxation of trade along the river.

The reason given by the SPDC was that they were going to launch an operation against the Wa “drug traffickers” in the area and they wanted the Lahu militia to clear out of the area in advance. As soon as the Lahu had withdrawn from their outposts along the river, SPDC troops were moved in to replace them.

At the same time that the Lahu militia were ordered to disarm and withdraw, the ex-MTA militia group operating around Murng Phong, close to the Mekong just north of the Thai border, were also asked by the SPDC to withdraw from the Mekong area. They were told they could continue conducting business, but could not operate as an armed force in the area, and could no longer wear military uniforms or carry guns. They were told this was to improve the international image of Burma, particularly along the border with Thailand.

“Cracking down” on the Wa (January - March 03)

In December 2002, the SPDC had also delivered an ultimatum to the various UWSA factions to vacate the areas they controlled along the Mekong, but the Wa had not agreed to move. When their military operation began in January, SPDC troops arriving in the Paliao area controlled by Wei Hsueh-yi, demanded again that the Wa vacate the area, and ended up burning down some of the Wa signboards and destroying some of the trees in their fruit orchards when they failed to comply. It was not until an order to move came from the UWSA headquarters in Pangsang (on the China border) that all of the remaining Wa troops and civilians under Wei Hsueh-yi, altogether about 3-400 people, left the Paliao-Kenglarb area in March to travel west to other Wa-controlled areas in Mong Hsat and Mong Ton townships in southern Shan State. At the same time, Pao Yu-hwa led about 200 of his troops and civilians from the Nam Yawn area to Mung Pawk, on the Chinese border, north of Kengtung, but left about 40-50 Wa in the area.

Interestingly, the SPDC made no similar moves against the NDAA controlling the northern section of the Mekong, despite the NDAA's involvement in the drug trade. The fact that the Wa in particular were targeted during this military operation is likely to have been because of their international notoriety as drug-producers, and the fact that many drugs were known to be passing across the southern section of the Mekong to neighbouring countries.




UWSA soldiers


However, the lack of arrests of Wa personnel or seizures of any drugs suggests that this was not a genuine crackdown. Also, the fact that the northern UWSA finally authorized the move, despite the potential loss of significant revenue from the drug trade in the area, indicates that some kind of deal must have been made between the UWSA and the SPDC to facilitate the move. Some local witnesses have testified to the fact at the time of the move, some of the UWSA simply moved their drug-producing facilities to the Lao side of the border.

The maps on pages 20-21 show how the operations during early 2003 led to a significant expansion of the SPDC's areas of control along the Mekong, providing them with both strategic and economic benefits.

BURMA'S EASTERN SHAN STATE POLITICAL SITUATION 2002



BURMA'S EASTERN SHAN STATE POLITICAL SITUATION JUNE 2003



REINFORCING INEQUITABLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

It is clear that while Burma remains under military rule and local communities deprived of their democratic rights to participate in development decisions, increased trade and investment along the Mekong river will simply reinforce the current inequitable and unsustainable development processes taking place in Eastern Shan State.

Trade and infrastructure in the hands of military and business elites

Owing to the isolationist policies of the Burmese military regime prior to 1988, there was little legal trade across the borders from eastern Shan State into neighbouring countries. The main products traded were consumer goods from Thailand, smuggled into Burma on the black market, and drugs and gems were smuggled out from Burma to Thailand.

This changed in 1988 when the regime began opening up the country's markets to foreign trade and investment in order to save itself from bankruptcy. The rich natural resources in the ethnic states were suddenly up for sale.

In Shan State, the regime began granting timber and gem concessions to both foreign and local investors. In southern Shan State, Thai timber companies were granted forestry concessions to extract teak, highly in demand following Thailand's own logging ban in 1989. On the northern Shan border, the sale of timber to China increased significantly after 1989, when the various armed groups in northern Shan State signed ceasefire agreements with the regime, allowing them to conduct business in their areas in return for giving up their armed resistance.

As well as being allowed to trade in timber and gems, the ceasefire armies were also given tacit approval to continue and expand drug production. According to US narcotic control reports, opium production in Shan State doubled between 1988 and 1996 to 2,500 tons. By 1997, various ceasefire armies were also producing and trading in amphetamines.

The result of the rapid selling off of natural resources and the sharp increase in drug production was the creation of newly-rich business elites among the leadership of the ceasefire armies. It is these elites who are currently dominating the economy in Shan State, together with various Burmese military commanders who are either receiving pay-offs from these groups, or are themselves conducting businesses in the area. These elites are amassing huge wealth, investing mainly in real estate in the main towns, building luxurious mansions, hotels and casinos. Meanwhile, the majority of the population remain in poverty, deprived of even basic social services.

The pivotal influence of the ceasefire organisations on the local economy is evident from their role in the construction of roads in eastern Shan State (see map on page 24). Unable to finance the building of all-weather roads themselves, the regime has in recent years permitted various ceasefire organisations to use their newly-earned capital to undertake major road construction projects.

The following main roads have been or are being built by ceasefire organisations:

1. The Tachilek to Kengtung road was built in 2001 by the UWSA's Hong Pang Company.
2. The Kengtung to Mong La road was built in 2000 by the NDAA's Asia Wealth Company.
3. The Mong Phyak to Mong Yawng road is being built by the Green Light Company (of UWSA's Wei Hsueh-Kang).
4. The Keng Tung to Mong Hkok road is being built by UWSA's Hong Pang Co.
5. The Kengtung to Mong Yang road is being built by UWSA's Hong Pang Co.


After road construction, the ceasefire organisations are able to collect tolls on the vehicles using the roads. For example, on the Tachilek-Kengtung road the UWSA have three toll-gates. This is in addition to five SPDC checkpoints along the same road, where various fees and bribes must be paid by vehicle owners in order to pass.

The construction of roads also enables the ceasefire organisations to control the exploitation of natural resources, particularly timber, in the newly accessible areas. For example, the UWSA is currently building the road from Mong Phyak to Mong Yawng, and also has a concession to cut the forests in the area.


The map on page 25 shows the current trade patterns in Eastern Shan State. Products being exported from Shan State are almost entirely raw products, particularly timber. While huge profits are being made by the military and business elites, local communities are not only being deprived of control over or benefits from the sale of their area's resources, but are having to bear the consequences of the resulting environmental degradation.

Unregulated natural resource exploitation

Given the rapid depletion of the natural resources in eastern Shan State over the past decade, it is clear that any increase in trade along the Mekong under the current political conditions will only speed up the plunder of these resources, and the process of environmental destruction.



MAIN TRADE ROUTES OF EASTERN SHAN STATE



Timber

The map below shows the serious state of deforestation in eastern Shan State. Based on information from interviewing local villagers, LNDO estimates that this area has lost about 50% of its forest cover since 1988, with most wood sold directly over the borders into China and Thailand. There is hardly any teak forest remaining, but other kinds of hardwood, pinewood and fragrant sandalwood are still in great demand.

Although nowadays most of the wood is transported by road up to the Chinese border, cut planks are also sent along the Mekong River up to China and downstream to Thailand.

DEFORESTATION IN EASTERN SHAN STATE 2003



In some areas SPDC military units are directly involved in logging. Most often, however, they and their proxies, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) simply gain profits by demanding fees from loggers at various stages of logging. The USDA is a nationwide government-sponsored organisation, responsible for rallying local support for the junta.

Prior to any logging, the groups carrying out the logging must pay the SPDC or USDA for a permit to carrying out logging in a certain area. After that, the loggers must pay the SPDC or USDA for a “chain-saw licence.” This is paid according to the number of chain-saws being used. When the wood has been cut, the loggers must then pay the SPDC or USDA at various checkpoints in order to transport the wood. As well as this, it is common for local SPDC military units to demand random security fees from loggers as they carry out logging.

Despite all these fees, the loggers still manage to make substantial profits from the sale of logs, owing to the high demand for wood in the neighbouring countries. The current sale price for pinewood, for example, is 35,000 baht (approx US\$830) per ton at the Thai border, and 700,000 kyat at the Chinese border. Most of the ceasefire groups and militia are involved in logging in their areas, some in conjunction with wealthy businessmen from the cities. The UWSA’s Hong Pang company is currently the main organisation in eastern Shan State carrying out logging. They have their own logging equipment, and also sub-contract other local or foreign (Thai or Chinese) loggers with equipment to carry out the logging.

It is local villagers who do the manual labour: felling the trees, sawing them into planks, and shouldering the wood out to the roads. Since they are usually paid according to the amounts of wood they can cut , approximately 7,000 kyat (approx US\$6) per ton,



*Jungle sawmill southwest of Kengtung
(Photo by LNDO, Feb 2003)*

it is not uncommon for them to work both night and day to earn more money. However, in some areas, SPDC officials force villagers to fell logs without any payment whatsoever. One villager from the Mong Noong area, north of Kengtung, who fled to the Thai border in October 2002, described how he was forced to cut wood for the SPDC:

“There is so much logging around Murng Noong, Murng Ka and Murng Khark. Major “G1” from LIB 227 in Murng Khark has been forcing villagers to cut trees in the area since mid-2000. If you can’t you must pay a fine of one silver rupee (the local currency) per tree. He arranges with local headmen to order the villagers to cut down a quota of trees each month. In my case, I was ordered to cut down 5 trees a month. The trees had to be 10 “sok” (cubits) in length and straight. The wood in the area is pinewood. There used to be lots of pinewood, but in the last two years about three- quarters has been cut down. No trees are being planted to re place them.

In 2001, the Chinese set up a saw-mill in Murng Noong, and wood is sent to be cut there. The wood is sold to the Chinese by the SPDC, but the Shans have to do all the cutting and transporting. After the wood is cut it is sent to China by truck via Ho Tao. “ (Interview with Shan refugee, Oct 2002)

While being ordered to cut wood for Burmese military commanders, local people are forbidden to cut down trees themselves. For example, in October 2002, the SPDC in Kengtung issued an order that anyone found cutting pine wood without authorization in the forests at “Nga Ou Su” west of Kengtung would be given a 12-year jail sentence and a 20,000 kyat fine. The area has already been almost entirely deforested under concessions granted by the SPDC.

During the period of blasting on the Mekong, wood continued to be transported along the river, mostly up to China. A traveller along the river in late March 2003 reported:

“I saw two sites in one day where wood was being brought down to the riverbank. In one site, it was already 8 pm at night, and they were using spotlights to carry on with the work. There were SPDC soldiers overseeing the work.” (Interview with Shan monk, May 2003)

Given the amount of wood already being sent out along the Mekong River, it is highly likely that improved navigation on the river will lead to increased amounts of wood being exported and continuing deforestation.

Wildlife and forest products

There is a huge demand from China for wildlife and forest products, mainly for medicinal purposes. These include tortoises, bears’ gall bladders, snakes, otter skins, pangolin scales and wild orchids. Despite the fact that many of these species are endangered and trade in them is prohibited in Burma, there exists a thriving black market network to

locate and export the various items. The main dealers are Chinese businesspeople living in towns such as Tachilek and Kengtung. They send out representatives to villages, where they place orders for certain products with local agents. Villagers are told that if they can find the products, they will receive a particular amount of money, for example up to 20,000 kyat (approx US\$20) per 10 ticals (approx 160 g) of bear's gall bladder or 150,000 kyat (approx US\$140) per viss (1.6 kg) for first class orchids.

Owing to increasing poverty caused by extortion and other forms of oppression by local military units, villagers are being driven in increasing numbers to seek income by searching for these products. They sell them to the local agents, who then transport them to the dealers in the towns. The dealers pay off the SPDC authorities, and then transport their products to be sold across the Chinese border.

Formerly, the jungle-covered mountains along the west bank of the Mekong were renowned for their abundant wildlife, including bears, deer, gaur, monkeys and elephants. However, local people report that few of these animals can be found these days. The continuing high demand for wildlife products in China means that increased trade along the Mekong will inevitably lead to an accelerated rate of loss of indigenous animals and plants, with possible extinction of some species.

Minerals

There are gold and coal deposits in the eastern Shan townships adjoining the Mekong. Although no large-scale mining has yet taken place, increased trade along the Mekong is likely to stimulate existing plans to exploit these resources. It is a source of concern that under the current regime there will be no prior consultation with local communities about any of these plans.

One such project planned without public consultation was the lignite power plant just outside the town of Tachilek, only a few kilometers from the Thai border. Building of the plant, owned by the UWSA, was started in May 2000. It was aimed to produce power from lignite mined near Mong Phyak, about 50 kms north of Tachilek. Despite the clear health hazards associated with the project, there was no consultation with any of the Tachilek residents. However, by May 2001, residents of the nearby Thai town of Mae Sai who would also be affected, had organised widespread protests against the plant, even barricading roads to prevent construction materials from being transported across the river. Finally, only thanks to the protests from the Thai side, the construction of the power-plant was halted.

The UWSA also had plans to develop gold mining in the area. Local people have for years panned for gold in the Nam Long river which flows through Talerh into the Mekong River, sometimes managing to earn the equivalent of US\$150 per month from this. In 2000 the UWSA's Hong Pang company made moves to take over the gold extraction in the area. They built a small dam on the Nam Long river near the village of Pang Pen,

about ten miles from the Mekong, to start channeling off water and extracting gold deposits from it. However, following appeals from the local villagers to the Lahu militia in the area, who challenged the UWSA, the Wa were forced to abandon the project.

Thus, so far the local people have been able to prevent outsiders from exploiting these gold resources. However, now that the SPDC has seized control of the area, it is highly likely that they will sell out the gold concessions to the highest bidder. Any large-scale exploitation of these resources will also have serious impacts on the environment.


Lack of sincere and sustainable drug eradication programs

Despite claims by the Burmese military regime of progress in opium eradication efforts, opium is continuing to be grown in abundance in many areas of Shan State, including in the easternmost townships adjoining the Mekong River. The map of opium cultivation in eastern Shan State on page 31 (based on information from local sources) shows that although opium is no longer being grown within a 5 mile radius of the main towns, it is still being cultivated on a wide scale in the remote mountainous regions, i.e. out of public view.

It is clear from interviews carried out by LNDO with villagers in Eastern Shan State during 2003 that there have been no sincere efforts on the part of SPDC authorities to eradicate drug production in the area. Orders not to plant poppies were given by local SPDC units via pro-government militia leaders to villagers in Kengtung, Mong Hsat and Mong Pieng in August and September 2002 before the start of the poppy growing season in October 2002; for example, Lahu militia leader Kyaw Law Bon Saw from Mong In tract in Kengtung, delivered the message from SPDC LIB 226 in Kengtung to each village in the tract during August 2002 that “If you dare plant poppies, your shoulder will be pierced with metal, and you’ll be tied up and dragged away.” However, many villagers took this risk, as they had no other source of income. In fact, when the first harvesting period arrived in December 2002, the SPDC took no action against those villagers who were growing poppies, so that during the second planting season in January 2003, most of the remaining villagers resumed their habitual cultivation of poppies.

At the same time, the SPDC continued to collect opium taxes from the various ethnic armed groups controlling the areas where poppies were being grown. The militia leader Kyaw Law Bon Saw who had delivered the threat to villagers not to grow opium in 2002 was witnessed collecting opium taxes in Na Seng village, Mong In tract, Kengtung, on March 17 2003, declaring the tax was also to pay for “security” from SPDC LIB 226 and LIB 314. The usual method of taxation is for the local commander of the armed group to demand between 10 to 20 ticals (150-320 g) of opium per household per season. Money from the sale of this is then shared between the commander himself, the ethnic armed group and the SPDC. As well as this, the armed groups usually organise the purchase of the remaining opium crop from the villagers, and then need to pay a

POPPY CULTIVATION IN SHAN STATE – EARLY 2003



protection fee to the SPDC to transport the opium to a border crossing point. Meanwhile, villagers themselves are lucky if they end up earning enough from their average annual opium crop of about 2 viss (3.2 kg) to buy rice to last through the year.


In the rare cases that the SPDC has made a token effort to provide alternative sources of income to villagers, this has been rendered meaningless by the ongoing extortion practices of the SPDC military. For example, in December 2002, SPDC troops from LIB 316 from Talerh destroyed the poppy fields of five villages on Mong Lane hill, 30 miles north of Tachilek, 10 miles from the Mekong River, and then gave a small chicken to each house as compensation. However, after three weeks troops from the same unit came to demand 5-7 viss (8-11 kg) of chicken meat from each village in the area, meaning that all the chickens which had been given to the villagers then had to be killed and given back to the troops as meat.

Apart from the opium trade, various ethnic armed groups also continue to be involved in the production of methamphetamines. For example, despite the supposed “drug crackdown” by the SPDC during early 2003, at least two methamphetamine production plants under the UWSA are still functioning along the Mekong River: one near Nam Yawn, and one near Pa Liao (from where the Wa were supposed to have been dislodged earlier this year). As with opium, the production of methamphetamines cannot take place without the collusion of the SPDC military authorities. They usually receive a monthly fee per plant, as well as a protection fee when the drugs are transported.

The main drug trafficking routes are shown in the map on page 33. Particularly since the Thai crackdown on drugs along the Thai-Burma border in early 2003, the Mekong river has become a major transit route for drugs. Even during the SPDC’s “anti-drug operation” along the Mekong in early 2003, Lahu sources report that drugs continued to flow across the river into Laos. An inhabitant of Ai Yi village on the Lao side of the Mekong opposite Burma, only about 30 miles up from the Thai border, testified that during February and March of 2003 there was an unusually large amount of drug trafficking across the river. He regularly witnessed groups of 20 or so men with knapsacks crossing the river, led by white-skinned men who appeared to be Chinese. It is unlikely that this scale of traffic could have continued if there had been a genuine crackdown on the Burmese side of the river.

With few other means of sustaining a livelihood, given the continual extortion by SPDC troops, an increasing amount of villagers living along the Mekong have become drug couriers. Particularly in the villages along the southern section of the Mekong, many of the men act as couriers, carrying drugs across the river to Laos. The huge sums they can earn for this (about 10,000 baht, or US\$250, per night) far outweigh fears of being caught.

MAIN DRUG ROUTES OF EASTERN SHAN STATE





villagers smoking opium in village on Mekong river bank (photo by LNDO, Jan 2003)

A serious social effect of this is a high rate of drug addiction among local communities. Many couriers became addicted after being given amphetamines to take during their journeys. Other members of the community simply become addicted because of the easy availability of drugs in the area. In villages along the southern section of Burma's Mekong visited by LNDO in early 2003, it appeared that over half of the total population, including children and women, were addicted to drugs, mainly amphetamines.

Since the lower part of the river where SPDC has now seized control is the main transit route for most of the drugs passing into Laos, many local people speculate that the aim of their military operation in early 2003, far from being to crack down on drugs, was actually to establish control over the trade. With the continuing economic crisis in Burma, and the regime's difficulties in maintaining its over-sized army, it is inconceivable that it could at this stage abandon one of its main sources of revenue.

Promotion of casino tourism

At each end of Burma's Mekong River, casinos have been built, catering mainly for foreign tourists, but also serving a money-laundering purpose for local drug-dealers. At the southern end, at Mong Phong, close to the Thai border, the "Paradise Casino," a luxurious casino and entertainment complex, was built by Thai investors on the Mekong riverbank in 1997. It is owned by the SPDC. his casino is one of several built close to the Thai-Burma border in Tachilek township, including the Regina hotel and golf complex, just outside the town of Tachilek.



Paradise casino, Mong Phong, Golden Triangle

On the northern end of the river, at the village of Ban Kawn on the riverbank opposite China, Sai Lin's NDAA ceasefire group has built a casino to which Chinese cross over and gamble.

Another larger casino complex built by NDAA at Eu Si Lin on the Chinese border is also accessible from the northern stretch of the

river, about one hour's drive north of Sop Lwe. Gamblers from as far away as Hong Kong take the boat along the Mekong from Thailand to come and gamble at this resort.



LT casino Mong La (July 2003)

The building of these casinos mirrors the development which has taken place in the town of Mong La, the capital of the NDAA ceasefire area. Mong La is now notorious as a “Las Vegas” on the Shan-China border, where not only gambling, but also prostitution, and trafficking in drugs and illegal Chinese immigrants is rife. The town has enjoyed a construction boom, but the surrounding villages remain poverty stricken. SPDC Secretary One General Khin Nyunt has frequently praised this area as a model development zone. One can thus expect further such casino resorts to be developed along the Mekong River once it is opened up for large-scale tourism.



Giant billboard in Mong La showing NDAA leader Sai Lin with Gen Khin Nyunt

Conclusion and recommendations

It is clear that the Mekong Navigation Improvement Project is fitting into a development agenda of the Burmese military regime that is benefitting only a small elite, and contributing to environmental degradation and the impoverishment of the majority of the population.

Until peace and democracy are restored to Burma, militarization is ended, and people are allowed genuine participation in development decisions affecting their communities, this destructive and unsustainable pattern of development will continue.

Therefore, the LNDO urges the governments of China, Laos and Thailand to immediately suspend the Mekong Navigation Improvement Project until proper environmental and social impact assessments are carried out with participation of affected communities. A prerequisite for this must be the restoration of genuine peace and democracy in Burma.

LNDO urges foreign governments and international funding agencies to withhold support for all development projects inside Burma's Shan State until a democratic system of government is installed which allows local people genuine participation in decision-making about the development of their area.

EASTERN SHAN STATE VILLAGES ALONG THE MEKONG RIVER

No.	Village	ethnicity	Approx. no. of houses	estimated population	Township	Tract
1	Mong Phong	Shan	200		TACHILEIK	Mong Phoong Tai
2	Wan Tong	"	80		"	
3	Pha Hi	"	50		"	
4	Ho Kho	"	60		"	
5	Pang Kha	"	40		"	
6	Wan Na	"	40		"	
7	Pa hsang	"	20		"	
8	Kya Vi	Lahu	20		"	
9	Pu Pa	"	25		"	
10	Sam Pu	Shan	60		"	
11	So Pu	Lahu	20		"	
12	So Pu	"	25		"	
13	Hoe Lone	"	11		"	MongPhoong Neu
14	Sang Khong	"	20		"	
15	Sang Khong	"	23		"	
16	Khai Lone	"	50		"	
17	Su Mi	"	25		"	
18	Su Mi	A kha	30		"	
19	Pu Pan	Shan	50		"	
20	Wan Poong	"	80		"	
21	Naung Chan	"	70		"	
22	Kya Ko	Lahu	15		"	
23	Pa Tao	"	20		"	
24	Naung Tao	"	80		"	
25	Pa Lem	Shan	70		"	
26	Mae Leik	Lahu	100		"	
27	Wei Lu	A kha	30		"	
28	Wan Sauk Khao	"	40		"	
29	Wei Le Lang	"	30		"	
30	Pang Kho Tai	"	35		"	
31	Pang Kho Neu	"	30		"	
32	Nam Khin	Shan	200		"	Nam Khin
33	Wan Ton	"	80		"	
34	Pang Peng	Lahu	120		"	
35	Nam San	Shan	60		"	
36	Na Pha	"	70		"	
37	Nang Naw	"	55		"	
38	Wan Mi Kao	Lahu	30		"	
39	Mae Hoon	"	40		"	
40	Sen Mai	"	35		"	
41	Sen Phon	"	20		"	
42	Kong Chilik	"	15		"	
43	Maw Len	"	20		"	

44	Li Shi	"	40		"	Nam Khin
45	Shan Su Pang	"	25		"	
46	Mu Se Lung	"	20		"	
47	Su Lee	"	20		"	
48	Pa Liao Lh	AkhaBur mese	150		"	Paliao
49	Paliao	A kha	20		"	
50	Pa Hsang	"	20		"	
51	Ha Chan Pang	Lahu	28		"	Keng Larb
52	Kya Khi Mai	"	25		"	
53	Kya Khi Kao	"	20		"	
54	Pa Len	Shan	75		"	
55	Wan Hai	"	60		"	
56	Ta Peng	"	80		"	
57	Wan Seng	"	50		"	
58	Keng Larb	A kha	35		"	
59	Kang Larb	Lahu	55		"	
60	Keng Larb	ShanBurm ese	300		"	
61	Kya Law	Lahu	20		"	
62	Kya Na	"	30		"	
63	Kya Bon Kha	"	30		"	
64	Kya Kha Kyao	"	15		"	
65	Kya Khi Ju	"	25		"	
66	A Ja Den	A kha	30		"	
67	Wan Jin	Shan	40		"	
68	Wan Na	"	45		"	
69	Wan Lon	"	60		"	
70	Sup Lwe	"	60		MONG YAWNG	Sop Lwe
71	Phia Khin	A kha	60		"	
72	Paw Phai Khin	"	75		"	
73	Kaw Phai Khin	"	50		"	
74	Kaw Pha Lon	"	80		"	
75	Kaw Pha Hsang	"	30		"	
76	Kaw Khin Hon	"	35		"	
77	Kaw Soon Pu	"	35		"	
78	Kaw Wan Di	"	40		"	
79	Kaw A Mai	"	25		"	
80	Kaw Phia Art	"	20		"	
81	Kaw Sup Pa	"	35		"	
82	Kaw Pha Song	"	45		"	
83	Wan Hin Kaw	"	25		"	
84	Wan Hin Mai	Shan	70		"	
85	Shin Noi Mai	"	80		"	
86	Mai Noi Kong	"	65		"	
87	Mong Thang	A kha	80		"	Mong Thang
88	Wan Mai Long	"	70		"	

89	Naung Ngeu	"	65		"	
90	Wan Nao	"	65		"	
91	Pha Lon Toung	"	55		"	
92	Pha Lon Mai	"	50		"	
93	Wan San Neu	Lahu	20		"	
94	Wan San Tai	"	15		"	
95	Kya In	"	10		"	
96	Kaw Kya In	A kha	30		"	
97	Mong Kham	Shan	55		"	Mong Kham
98	Naw Hawk	"	60		"	
99	Wan In	"	50		"	
100	Wan Na Mou	"	45		"	
101	Wan Hawk	"	35		"	
102	Na Yao Lon	"	45		"	
103	Line Tai	"	45		"	
104	Lai Neu	"	30		"	
105	Wan Phyak	"	35		"	
106	A Song	A kha	35		"	
107	Chan Lik	"	30		"	
108	Nam Thon	"	30		"	
109	A Paw Law	"	25		"	
110	A Da Pang	"	60		"	
111	Wan Hin Kong	Lahu	25		"	
112	May E Kyao	"	20		"	
113	Say Lon	"	15		"	
114	Kya Wa Mai	"	10		"	
115	Kya Wa Kao	"	10		"	
116	Sop Lon	"	15		"	
117	Shan Wan	"	7		"	
118	Wan Pin	"	10		"	
119	Hoe Pao	"	5		"	
120	Wan Ma Kwe	"	8		"	
121	Bok Ao	"	12		"	
122	Mung Lon	"	8		"	
123	Kya In Nang	"	13		"	
124	Su Pang	"	13		"	
125	Pipe Mai	"	18		"	
126	Sa Lon	"	25		"	
127	Sa Mai	"	15		"	
128	Kya In Noi	"	10		"	
129	Wan Kong	"	18		"	
130	Wan Voi Mai	"	12		"	
131	Khan Bo Kham	"	25		"	
132	Paw E Kyao	"	30		"	
			5,706	22,800		

